



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Churchill: The Prize and the Task

Now that Winston Churchill has won his "last prize," the premiership of Britain in the general election of October 25, he must pluck out the many thorns amid his laurels. Governing postwar Britain has never been a simple task. Since the general election of February 1950 the task has proved almost impossible, due to the narrow parliamentary majority which returned Clement Atlee's Labor party to office without really returning it to power. During the ensuing 19-month reign of what has been called the "unhappy Parliament" few decisions could be made without an acute consciousness of their effect on the shaky electoral balance.

Mr. Churchill's first thorn is the fact that his government is only slightly better off than its predecessor. The Conservatives for the past six years have pointed out that even in 1945 the Labor party did not poll a majority of the total votes cast. But the latest election results gave Labor, now in opposition, an even stronger talking point, since the outgoing government actually outpolled the Conservatives. The Labor vote was greater than ever before, slightly more than 13.9 million as against over 13.7 million for the Tories.

Labor's percentage of the total vote was 48.74; that for the Conservatives was 48.03.

The Conservatives must credit their victory to the fact that they outdid the Labor party in winning marginal constituencies largely because they gained the support of 1950 Liberal voters who, in this contest, were left without candidates of their own. However limited their mandate, the Conservatives won 321 seats to Labor's 295. This gave them a working majority of 26 over Labor's full strength and a lead of 17 over all parties, a better position than that of the outgoing Labor government, which clung to office with majorities of five and six. But the Conservatives will be faced with some threat of being overturned by a sudden vote, as well as being assured of a hard fight to maintain their lead when by-elections come along.

Perhaps the greatest asset Mr. Churchill's government has is the psychological one of being new. Mr. Churchill, a buoyant personality despite his own 76 years, comes in with young and fresh cabinet material—54-year-old Anthony Eden as foreign secretary and deputy prime minister and 49-year-old Richard Austen Butler as chancellor of the

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exchequer, to name the two who will be taxed with the toughest jobs. Other members of the cabinet, as well as back-bench M.P.'s in the Tory ranks, can be expected to bring a verve to their tasks which has slipped away as Labor ministers grew tired and harried under gruelling responsibilities.

Economic Storm Signals

The responsibilities promise to be equally burdensome, however, for the new regime. Hugh Gaitskell, Labor's chancellor of the exchequer, announced on October 3 that the sterling area had received a "sharp setback" during the third quarter of the year, its gold and dollar reserves falling by \$598 million to \$3,269 million. Another coal shortage, accompanied by interruptions in electric power, threatens this winter. A steel shortage, attributed to a curtailment of foreign scrap iron, has already set in. Britain's three-year £4.7-billion defense program is absorbing more and more of the production of the engineering and metal trades, throwing the burden of the export drive on consumption goods at a time when Japanese and German competition is growing. All this, economists state, amounts to more than coincidence; it is inflation. They prescribe another dose of the disinflationary measures Sir Stafford Cripps applied in 1948 but admit these will prove more difficult while the British economy is stretched to carry out the defense program.

The Conservative government is committed to the denationalization of the steel industry and truck trans-

portation and decentralization of the nationalized coal mines. Even if the Tories are right in arguing that these reforms will increase efficiency, the changes are not likely to bring early relief to the over-all economy. The Conservative pledge to increase house-building to a target of 300,000 dwellings a year is likely to produce a new call on Britain's limited resources, rather than the reverse. Shaving ministerial salaries, as Mr. Churchill did on October 31, dramatizes the need for cutting government spending but in itself effects only a small saving.

If Mr. Churchill sets about to curtail British consumption—a course advised by many experts—he may face an acute problem with the trade unions. Britain, although not strike-free under the Labor party, enjoyed far greater industrial peace than might have otherwise been the case. The trade unions have now lost their direct pipeline to Downing Street, but their real power remains immense, first because of Britain's overfull employment and, second, because the Labor party in opposition remains strong.

Churchill and Empire

Interest abroad naturally centers on the accent Churchill will give to British foreign policy. Few great changes can be anticipated, but the world will be disappointed if the prime minister does not make history in his own epic way. In 1898 in his youth he rode in the charge of the Twenty-first Lancers that broke the power of the dervishes in the Sudan, preparing the way for

the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. It was he, also, who as first lord of the Admiralty "nationalized" the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by buying a controlling interest in its shares for the British government in 1913-14. Now he and Mr. Eden, his heir apparent, must devise new means in a far more complex era for pacifying the same areas.

A great many questions of emphasis remain. Will the Conservatives do anything to retract the recognition extended to Communist China by Britain in 1950? It is doubtful that they will, since it has not been Foreign Office practice to use recognition as a political weapon. Will Mr. Churchill's voice prove more influential in Washington than Mr. Bevin's or Mr. Attlee's? The new prime minister will certainly be heard more sympathetically in congressional circles which have been critical of Britain's socialism, but a lot will depend on what is to be sought. And perhaps the biggest question is whether Mr. Churchill will carry through with his pre-election proposal that high level negotiations be conducted with the Soviet Union. Current speculation indicates that he may make a trip to the United States to convince Mr. Truman that such a course is worth while. The prime minister asked for his last prize because it would give him the opportunity of trying to prevent another war. If he should succeed, it will be a glittering prize indeed, not for himself alone, but for the world.

WILLIAM W. WADE

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Our Middle East 'Fringe'

The United States recently has begun to fashion a foreign policy for the Middle East somewhat on the model of policy in the Far East. That is, our Middle Eastern policy is focused on a few "fringe" states and emphasizes military rather than social and political relationships.

The Far Eastern "fringe" consists of Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Formosa and French Indo-China. On those states we concentrate our attention; together they form a shield against the projection of Soviet influence eastward and southward beyond Soviet Asia, North Korea and Communist China. It is a defensive policy, designed to hold a line, but not accompanied by a positive program for bringing about a rapprochement either with countries committed to friendship toward the U.S.S.R. or with countries which are not wholehearted supporters of the United States but which at the same time do not uphold Soviet policy, like the Indonesian Republic, Burma and India.

The Arabs and Israel

In the Middle East the fringe is shorter, consisting of Greece, Turkey and the Suez Canal zone. Greece and Turkey constitute the shield against the projection of Russian influence southward from Bulgaria or the Black Sea. The canal is indispensable in the strategic control of the eastern Mediterranean. For the present, at least, this policy glosses over the problem of insecurity and instability in the Middle East resulting from the failure of Israel and the Arab states to compose their differences. Instead, it stresses the military importance of Greece and Turkey,

which are not concerned with the quarrel over Israel.

Our new Middle Eastern policy began to take shape almost coincidentally with the denunciation by Egypt of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty on October 8. Egypt demanded that the British abandon the Suez Canal zone, which British troops police, as well as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The State Department was then drafting a defense plan with Egypt as a participant.

Egypt has been cool to the United States since the establishment of Israel as a new nation. On October 25 the important Cairo newspaper *Al Ahram* said: "The United Nations committed the greatest crime in human history by liquidating an Arab country to give part of it to immigrant Jews." The United States often gets credit along the Nile for inciting the UN to this "crime."

When the State Department presented its Middle East defense plan to Egypt after the denunciation of the 1936 treaty, the Egyptian government not unexpectedly rejected the invitation to take part. Secretary of State Dean Acheson thereupon announced that the United States supported the British contention that the treaty was valid and that Britain would use force if necessary to maintain the treaty in effect. Acheson's comment should not be interpreted as a corollary to the Truman Doctrine. Neither he nor any other American official has yet said or implied that the United States will use force to support the British, who have shown their determination to stay on by reinforcing the Suez garrison.

The United States thereupon re-

vised its scheme for a Middle East defense plan. On October 25 the State Department announced that it was negotiating a new plan not with Egypt but with Britain, France, Turkey, New Zealand, Australia and the Union of South Africa. This policy for the security of the Middle East involves agreement chiefly among nations which have interests in the area but are not situated there.

Weakness of Middle East

The Middle East policy founded on the defense plan flows from other American policies. It is an offshoot of the Truman Doctrine insofar as it strengthens the military relationship between the United States and the Truman Doctrine nations, Greece and Turkey. It is also an offshoot of the North Atlantic treaty. The North Atlantic foreign ministers meeting at Ottawa in September agreed to take Greece and Turkey into their partnership. Now those two countries become the pivot between the North Atlantic treaty and the proposed Middle East Defense Command, which, if it functioned well, could overcome a weakness in the North Atlantic alliance. That weakness arises out of the failure of Britain and the United States to agree on the strategy of defense of the eastern Mediterranean during conversations last spring and early summer.

No matter how well plans progress for the establishment of the new command, however, Washington is likely to find that social and political unrest in the countries south and east of the fringe states will keep the Middle East an insecure area as far as the United States is concerned.

BLAIR BOLLES



Is It Wise to Rearm the Germans?

by George Fielding Eliot

George Fielding Eliot is military analyst for the Mutual Broadcasting System, and his column, "The Military Scene," appears in 40 daily newspapers throughout the United States. In the spring of 1951 he spent several months visiting the Allied forces in Germany and other European countries.

ANY American discussion of the wisdom of rearming Germany—or Western Germany—must begin with recognition of one basic fact:

The United States is irrevocably committed to the defense of Western Europe against Soviet attack.

We are committed to this course, morally and physically, not only by the terms of the North Atlantic pact, but even more so by the actions we have taken to implement our obligations under that pact: most notably by the appointment of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower to be Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe.

Hence there is little point in arguing that the danger of Russian attack does not exist. The North Atlantic alliance came into being because the freely elected governments of its members, and the political and military advisers of those 12 governments, believed the danger to be genuine. The purpose of the great alliance is to abate the danger by confronting the Soviet Union with an unacceptable military risk. This is the established policy of the United States government—a policy supported by Congress and the American people.

For Americans, therefore, the question of German rearmament must be considered within the framework of our existing commitments to the defense of Europe.

So considered, two questions require to be answered: (1) Is German rearmament advisable from the purely military point of view, as applied to the immediate problem of confronting the Soviet Union with

an unacceptable military risk? (2) If the answer to this question is Yes, are there political or long-range military risks in German rearmament which outweigh its current military advantages?

Need for Space

The immediate military position may be bluntly summarized as follows: (1) No ground defense of Western Europe can be considered secure as long as Germany—or Western Germany—remains a no-man's-land into which Soviet armies can penetrate at will. (2) No ground defense of Western Germany is practicable without the participation of German forces.

The principal reason why no defense of Western Europe can be considered secure without including at least Western Germany is that the defensive area of France and the Low Countries, that is, the area west of the Rhine, is lacking in sufficient depth both for maneuver and for the enormous supply and maintenance establishments required by the mechanized forces of highly industrialized states.

The answer which American genius makes to totalitarian massed battalions consists of mobility and fire power. Mobility and fire power emphasize machines rather than bodies on the battlefield. The supply and maintenance of modern fighting machines in quantity requires a huge semi-industrial establishment echeloned all the way from the sources of power in the home territory to within a few miles of the actual combat area. This means

space to put things—plenty of space. The trouble already encountered in finding space merely for a few new United States airfields in France is a minor but significant forerunner of the logistic and space problems that would have to be met in war.

Other military objections to commencing the defense of Western Europe at the Rhine may be briefly stated:

(1) Denmark and the German North Sea coast, plus northern Holland, would be abandoned to the enemy. This would not only facilitate the exit of Russian submarines from the Baltic, but—far worse—would expose the British Isles to bombardment by Soviet guided missiles and short-range aircraft.

(2) The industrial resources of the Ruhr would be lost at the outset of hostilities.

(3) The effectiveness of Allied tactical air power in the fight for air superiority and for isolation of the battlefield, on which the defensive capabilities of the ground forces must largely depend, would be sharply decreased by lack of space for dispersal of airfields and by the increased ranges necessary to reach desirable targets.

Thus the defense of Western Germany is essential—or at least highly desirable—for any well-planned defense of Western Europe.

As to the second proposition—that the defense of Germany is not practicable without the participation of German troops—we have only to ask ourselves what would be the feelings of American, British, French, Bel-

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by Saul K. Padover

Dr. Saul K. Padover, Dean of the School of Politics, New School of Social Research, was a combat intelligence officer in the Psychological Warfare Division, U. S. Army, in France and Germany. He visited Western Germany and Berlin during the past summer.

THE American decision to rearm Germany, despite the extreme reluctance of our European allies, is based on two main assumptions. One is that the Kremlin is ready at any moment to hurl its armed forces into Western Germany and, therefore, we must help the Germans defend themselves. The other is that a rearmed, and consequently powerful, Germany would be our ally.

Neither of these assumptions is based on realities.

There are at least four main reasons why the first assumption is fallacious; why, in other words, a Red Army invasion of Western Germany (or Europe in general) is not in the cards.

Does Russia Want War?

First, the pattern of Russian aggression has been political and not military. In Czechoslovakia, Korea, China—to mention but a few recent examples—the Russians used native Communists and not their own troops to seize power. This, together with propaganda and subversion, is still Russia's basic tactic for world conquest. Germany is no exception.

Second, the masters of the Kremlin are Marxists who believe that history is on their side and that sooner or later Europe and the rest of the world will inevitably go Communist. Hence they think they can afford to wait.

Third, there is evidence to show that the Kremlin is afraid to expose its troops to Western civilization. In the first months of the occupation of Germany thousands of Soviet troops deserted when they discovered that

the Communists had lied to them about "capitalistic misery." Indeed, so great is the Kremlin's fear of exposing Red soldiers to Western influence that today Soviet troops in Eastern Germany and Austria are kept in confinement to their barracks. Only top Russians are permitted to have contact with Germans and Austrians.

Finally, and this is of course decisive, Moscow knows that the moment Red troops cross the present line, World War III will start automatically. The United States has given the Soviet Union clear warning to that effect. It is reasonable to assume that Moscow is aware that in case of war the United States could and would atomize, paralyze and knock out Russia's vital centers. This probably would end the Communist regime and certainly the lives of the present rulers. The bosses of the Soviet Union are hardly anxious to commit suicide. They have everything to lose and nothing to gain from another world war.

All of these reasons, incidentally, help to explain why the Russians until now have made no effort to conquer Western Germany and the rest of Europe. Between 1946 and 1950 all of Europe lay wide open to invasion. And yet the Red army, despite its overwhelming strength and lack of military opposition, did not move to seize Europe. The Russians did not do it because, it must be repeated, they operate politically rather than militarily.

The second assumption—that a rearmed Germany would be on our side—overlooks essential geographic,

economic and political factors. The fact is that once Germany is sovereign and has an armed force it becomes the most powerful country in Europe, next to the Soviet Union. Excepting Soviet Russia, Germany is not only numerically the biggest country in Europe but also has the greatest industrial plant, with a potential steel-producing capacity of 30 million tons a year. So mighty a country cannot and will not be anybody's puppet.

Germany and Russia

Could Germany, then, be expected or induced to become an ally of the United States and the West? There are at least two fundamental reasons for doubting it. One is economic-geographic; the other, political-territorial.

First, Germany's vast industrial plant needs foreign markets. The Slavic East has long been an important outlet for German goods. East-West trade may be momentarily slowed up by the allies but cannot be permanently prevented. Regardless of political likes or dislikes, economically the Germans and the Russians need each other much more than they need the Americans. And basic economic factors, we know, have a way of cutting through mere political bias.

Secondly, modern Germany's traditional foreign policy has been Russia-orientated. The two exceptions to this—Kaiser Wilhelm II's war with Tsarist Russia in 1914-17 and Hitler's attack on Soviet Russia in 1941—proved to be disasters for the Reich. Since Bismarck's days it has been a maxim of German foreign policy to have a secure Eastern flank. In this respect the facts of geography are stubborn and immutable.

A strong Germany will, once

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Eliot

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gian, Dutch and Danish troops fighting and dying in the heart of Germany while the Germans stood idly by as spectators? And how long could they stay there without the active support of the German population in their rear, operating transport, industries and other facilities on which the maintenance of an army depends? And would the German people be wholehearted in meeting these exacting demands unless given confidence and a sense of participation by the inclusion of German troops in the defense of Germany?

So the answer from the military point of view is certainly that the participation of German troops in the defense of Europe is not only advisable but that without such participation very heavy additional risks must be assumed by the North Atlantic pact nations.

Political Risk

How about the long-range or political risk of rearming Germany? Confronted with a military necessity of the foreseeable future, its claims seem to outweigh the possible dangers of the unforeseeable future. Of one thing we may be sure—some day Germany will be both rearmed and-independent. No device has yet been found to keep great nations

permanently in leading strings, nor to bind sovereign governments to a course of conduct which at a future time may appear to be contrary to their interests. We may be able to delay German rearmament and independence. We cannot prevent them forever.

There is a tangible and immediate military benefit to be derived from assisting German rearmament now, while the self-interest of the Germans binds their nation to help defend Western Europe against the barbarian tide from the East. Against that tangible and immediate benefit, we have to weigh the risk that at some future time a rearmed Germany may do something we will not like. But that is a risk which, in the long run, we cannot avoid anyway. By all means, therefore, let us take the cash and let the credit go.

Padover

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more, be driven by its own internal dynamics and military tradition to some form of expansion. It will be in a position to bargain with both Moscow and Washington. As a matter of fact, the German generals are already beginning to do so arrogantly. There are today 1,200 veterans' organizations in Germany; their leaders, generals all, openly proclaim either their neutrality between East and West or their desire to bargain with both.

What can we offer this Germany that is becoming increasingly more nationalistic? Democracy? To the emerging militarists and Nazi-minded nationalists democracy has no meaning. Territorial expansion? This we could not do without forfeiting our moral position in the world and losing our European friends. The Russians, on the other hand, will be in a position to offer a strong Germany not only markets but also new frontiers, if necessary. A fifth partition of Poland is by no means out of the question. Then there are also Austria and the Sudetenland, not to mention France.

Does this sound farfetched? Not if recent history, in fact all history, is any guide.

In sum, our urgency to rearm Germany is misguided and based on unrealistic premises. In restoring the German military to power, we may not only be creating a Frankenstein but also endangering whatever future the decent, democratic Germans now have.

A more realistic policy would be to discourage German rearmament and to encourage, support and aid the democratic elements which are now struggling for survival in Germany. It is only among these democratic men and women, and not among the Nazis and militarists, that we can hope to find friends and fellow-fighters for peace.

FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT



Kashmir and the Khyber Pass

The assassination of Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Kahn at Rawalpindi in the turbulent Punjab on October 16 by Said Akbar, a native of Afghanistan and a member of a militant Muslim sect, has

had a sobering effect on both Pakistan and India. This tragedy has thereby improved prospects for a reasoned discussion of the explosive Kashmir problem.

In a swift and smooth transition

which averted the possibility of unrest in the wake of Liaquat's murder, Kwaja Nazimuddin, who had been governor general, became prime minister, and Ghulam Mohammed, former finance minister, assumed the

office of governor general. The new prime minister, a devout Muslim who has the reputation of being a shrewd and forceful politician, faces the immediate task of dealing with a dangerous but little publicized issue which has been underlined by the identity of Liaquat's assassin. This is Pakistan's bitter controversy with Afghanistan, a feudal Muslim kingdom, over the status of about 5 million Pathan tribesmen in Baluchistan, the Northwest Frontier Province and the free tribal areas administered by the Karachi government, which include the strategic Khyber Pass, vigilantly guarded by the British against the Russians in the nineteenth century.

Thunder in the North

The dissident tribes, who are reported to receive Afghan help as well as some sympathy from India, have set up the "Independent Government of Pakhtunistan" (Land of the Pakhtoons or Pathans) at Gureik in southern Waziristan near the Afghan border and have intermittently clashed with Pakistani frontier forces. The Pakistanis fear that Afghanistan may eventually try to annex the tribal territories—an action that might benefit the U.S.S.R., which borders on Afghan territory. As in the days of British rule, the fate of the border tribes is thus an international, not merely a local, problem.

While concerned with events along its northern frontier, Pakistan is impatient to settle the question of Kashmir, which has envenomed its relations with India since the two nations achieved independence in 1947. Prime Minister Kwaja Nazimuddin, in his first public speech on October 21, expressed regret that the United Nations Security Council had not yet taken steps to insure a free and impartial plebiscite in Kash-

mir, but declared that he wanted to settle the issue "peacefully and amicably." He thus echoed the hopes of India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who at the annual convention of the All-India Congress party on October 17 had spoken in moving terms about Liaquat's death and had pleaded for the "hushing up" of all controversies between India and Pakistan and "a sincere attempt to place the relations between the two countries on a new basis." If the improved atmosphere created by this exchange of friendly sentiments persists, it may facilitate constructive consideration in both countries of the report submitted to the United Nations Security Council in October by Dr. Frank P. Graham, American mediator appointed by the UN. In his report, which the United Nations Security Council began to study in Paris on October 29, Dr. Graham recommended the continuance of negotiations for demilitarization of Kashmir preparatory to a plebiscite.

Meanwhile, in Kashmir the India-backed government of Sheikh Abdullah, a Muslim, announced the convening of a constituent assembly in Srinagar, Kashmir's summer capital, on October 31. According to a well-informed observer who has recently visited Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah is a man of unusual ability and great balance and in no way a Communist. He has effected land reforms described as the most thoroughgoing in the subcontinent, has launched a promising program of rural development, and through an able director of education is creating a modern educational system. Given a completely free choice, the Kashmiris would prefer independence or at least complete autonomy, but they realize that in a world threatened by aggression small states must lean on one great power or

another and that they must therefore make some kind of choice between India and Pakistan.

Indian Elections

While Pakistan rallies its internal forces to carry on under a new prime minister, India prepares for the first national elections on a basis of full adult franchise in its history, scheduled to take place early in January, when 175 million will go to the polls. In the election campaign, now under way, Prime Minister Nehru, who in September also became president of the Congress party, following the ouster of his political opponent, Purshottamdas Tandon, is being challenged not only by the Socialists and the Communists, but also by the recently created People's party, of which Acharya J. B. Kripalani is the leader, and by a former member of his cabinet, Columbia-educated Law Minister B. R. Ambedkar, leader of India's untouchables. Dr. Ambedkar is particularly critical of the failure of the Congress party to push through Parliament the Hindu code bill on which he had vigorously worked for four years. The bill, which would revolutionize Hindu society by permitting women to divorce their husbands and allowing them to inherit property, was abandoned in September when it became evident that conservative Hindus would persist in blocking its passage.

Therefore, the Congress party, which once united all political groups in India except the Communists for the national struggle against British rule, now has to contend with other parties as the Indian people turn their attention to far-reaching and divisive domestic problems which before 1947 had been overshadowed by the paramount desire to achieve independence.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

As Others See Us

The stereotyped belief that Americans are wealthy and uncultured seems to crop up regularly at far-away points of the globe, even when commentators are favorably disposed toward cooperation with the United States. For instance, Barnett Potter, editor of *The British Africa Review*, an independent, pro-British monthly published in Johannesburg, stated in its June issue:

"The uncouthness and thrustingness of some American elements are distasteful; many of them have the disagreeable characteristics of the adolescent. But the real peril that confronts the world, now that German brutality and insolence have been exorcised, is the cruelty of the Oriental—of which Soviet Russia is a part, for Russia is an Oriental with a European visage. We can protect ourselves against it—provided we exercise a little common sense about who are our friends and who are our enemies and . . . keep in step with our friends."

Elsewhere in the Commonwealth, the pro-Nehru *Bombay Chronicle* of August 31 put a good deal more sting into this particular cliché in commenting on American-Indian differences about the Japanese peace

treaty. "Is it something for Americans to be proud of," the paper asked, "to betray the spirit of the vulgar, dollar-intoxicated rich? Almost every time there is any kind of conflict between Indian and American views of any international question a set of Americans can be depended upon to flaunt the wheat loan in language and spirit that are cheap, petty and repulsive."

A much kinder view of the United States is taken by the British philosopher Bertrand Russell in his latest book, *Unpopular Essays*. Contem-

plating the future of mankind and the possibility of a war arising from East-West tensions, he states why he would prefer an American victory: "One can hardly imagine the American army seizing the dons at Oxford and Cambridge and sending them to hard labor in Alaska. . . . After a victory of an alliance led by the United States there would still be British culture, French culture, Italian culture . . . ; there would not, therefore, be the same dead uniformity as would result from Soviet domination."

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